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Abstract : A method is proposed for during transients
emergency control which predicts the evolution of a sys-
tem undergoing a major disturbance and, if loss of syn-
chronism is anticipated decides control actions able to
contain it. The method emanates from SIME, a hybrid
time-domain  direct method originally designed for real-
time preventive transient stability assessment and control.
The devised “emergency SIME” has similar interesting
features, namely, robustness, accuracy, speed - and also
predictive capabilities. Besides, the emergency approach
has some intrinsic advantages over the “preventive” ap-
proach, namely, it is free from modelling and/or parameter
uncertainties (since it relies on real-time measurements
rather than time-domain simulations), and it encounters
the real stability problem (operating point and contin-
gency scenario rather than base case solutions and list
of plausible contingencies). The method is general with
respect to power system configurations, types of genera-
tion and of controls. In this paper a generation shedding
scheme is worked out and applied to the real-time mon-
itoring of the Itaipu-Foz do Iguac¸u corridor. It is shown
that it can advantageously complement the existing auto-
matic emergency control scheme.
Keywords : Emergency control; transient stability;
SIME; generation shedding; real-time transient stability
emergency control.
1 INTRODUCTION
Dynamic security assessment (DSA) has long been recog-
nized to be an issue of great practical concern [Dy Liacco,
1979]. The recent deregulated practices make the need
for effective DSA methods more urgent than ever.
What holds true for predictive DSA which deals with
“what if” questions holds even more true for emergency
DSA : today, emergency DSA becomes a necessity, given
the trend to operate the systems increasingly closer to their
limits, and given the difficulties in predicting the operating
conditions and the troublesome contingencies likely to
occur. But at the same time, emergency DSA is even
more challenging than preventive one, particularly for
transient stability, where the phenomena develop within
few hundreds of milliseconds.
This paper deals with “during transients” emergency TSA
and control (TSAC), i.e. with situations where the power
system is actually undergoing a major disturbance. The
purpose is to predict during the transients the evolution
of the system and if necessary to appraise and trigger
control actions so as to prevent its serious degradation;
more specifically, the concern is to predict the system
behaviour following a (major) disturbance by processing
real-time measurements taken on the power system, and if
instability is anticipated, to assess its degree of instability
and decide proper control actions in time so as to prevent
loss of synchronism.
Such a stringent objective raises hardware and software
problems (e.g., see Centeno et al., 1993; Chang et al.,
1993; Fouad et al., 1986; Prasetijo et al., 1996; Rovnyak
et al., 1995; Takahashi et al., 1988; Kojima et al., 1997.)
This paper addresses the software problem. The derived
method emanates from the “preventive SIME” initially
developed in the context of preventive TSAC [Zhang et
al.,1997a; Bettiol et al., 1998]. This “emergency SIME”
was proposed quite recently [Zhang et al., 1997b]. It is
revisited in this paper and further illustrated on a real-
world problem namely, the transient stability monitoring
of the Itaipu-Foz do Iguac¸u corridor.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the
emergency SIME. Section 3 describes the derived practi-
cal procedure in the particular case of a generation shed-
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Figure 1 - OMIB "$# curves (Prediction technique)
of Itaipu’s emergency control. Section 5 identifies three
main classes of emergency control schemes. Section 6
draws conclusions. Appendix A describes SIME’s essen-
tials and formulation; the reader who is not familiar with
SIME is kindly advised to start with this Appendix.
2 FOUNDATIONS OF THE
EMERGENCY SIME
2.1 Problem statement
The “during-transients” emergency approach1 rely on
real-time measurements that it processes so as to pro-
vide a stability diagnostic early enough before the system
loses synchronism (e.g. 250 ms ahead). To this end,
it transforms the incoming multimachine power system
measurements into those of an equivalent one-machine-
infinite bus (OMIB) system, and calls upon the equal-area
criterion to assess stability.
More precisely, the method aims to predict the stability
of the system entering its post-fault configuration, i.e.
after the disturbance inception and its clearance, using the
multimachine data available at successive time samples
∆ % ’s (e.g., 1 sample per cycle). Thus, at each time
sample, an OMIB analysis is performed to see whether
the system keeps stable or it is driven to instability. The
main tool for this analysis is the prediction of the OMIB
"$#&(' curve, and hence the prediction of the unstable
angle, '*) , and corresponding stability margin (see the
Appendix). This analysis is elaborated below.
2.2 Strategy for real-time stability assess-
ment
The following two questions must be addressed : 1.-
which are the most disturbed machines ? 2.- is the system
driven to (in)stability and to what extent ? (i.e. what is
the sign and size of the stability margin ?). The answers
to these questions rely on the following steps, illustrated
in Figs 1.




%1032 2∆ %54 consider the incoming measurements at
times %,+6 2∆ % , %,+6 ∆ % , and use Taylor series to predict
the individual machine angles at some time ahead (e.g.
100 ms). Sort the machines in decreasing order of these
1Here, the type of control provided by the emergency SIME is also
called “during-transients” to emphasize that the method is activated
after a disturbance inception and its clearance, and that the remedial
actions are appraised and devised on-line. Therefore, in order to be
effective, the method must be ahead of real-time.
angles and consider as candidate critical machines those
advanced machines which are above the largest gap.
(ii) Construct the corresponding OMIB, determine its pa-
rameters ( '8719:7;<75" # ) 2 from the corresponding parame-
ters of the individual power plants at times %,+= 2∆ % ,
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(iii) Solve eq. (1) to find ' )>I ' - %,+J4 such that
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(iv) Compute the decelerating area, OQP 01R 2 , sketched in
Fig. 2 :








and, hence the stability margin, Z , according to eqs (A.5)-
(A.7); it comes :













(v) If Z is found to be negative or close to zero, declare
the system to be unstable and determine control actions
(see `a` 2.3, 2.4).
(vi) Compute the time to instability, %,) , i.e. the time
for the OMIB to reach its unstable angle, ' ) , i.e. to go
unstable. This may be computed, for example, by using























and solving for %,) .
(vii) Acquire a new set of measurements and continue
monitoring the system.
Remark
Obviously, the above predictive stability assessment relies
on two main approximations.
c First, the OMIB used here might not necessarily be the
critical OMIB which would be identified at % ) , i.e.
when the OMIB actually reaches its unstable angle,
'
) ; however, it is likely to contain part of the most
disturbed machines and certainly machines on which
corrective action will effectively contribute to stabilize
the system.
c Second, the " # U' curve relies on a measurement-
based prediction – rather than accurate computation.
Various extrapolation techniques may be used, differ-
ent from the one described above. The least squares
technique used in this paper shows to be particularly
robust.
Further comments
2Actually, eq. (A.4) shows that when the OMIB inertia coefficient is
known (i.e. when the machines inertia coefficients are stored), de may




















Figure 2 - Principle of emergency control
1.- Computationally, the above strategy is extraordinarily
unexpensive and fast; indeed, at each time sample, it
merely requires (a) the solution of the individual Taylor
series and OMIB identification; (b) computation of the
OMIB parameters (see eqs (A.1) to (A.3), and of the " #
curve (1)); (c) its solution (2); (d) computation of the
margin (4). Obviously, all these computations require
only fractions of ms.
2.- It may happen that the largest gap does not appear
clearly enough at the beginning of the post-fault transients,
thus leading to an unclear diagnostic. However, in such a
case instability is likely to develop rather slowly; hence,
time will be available to continue monitoring until the
phenomena become clearer.
3.- According to our experience (see also the example in




 2∆ % to % + 4 yields a stable margin may actually be
unstable. It is therefore advisable to continue monitoring
the system for % + 2 ∆ %=7*NaN*Nt7 for about one second before
declaring it definitely stable.
4.- With reference to eq. (4), observe that for given clear-
ing time %10 the margin Z should be constant whatever the
time %,+ . Therefore the margin at successive %,+ ’s should
converge to an (almost) constant value; this may be used
to assess the accuracy of the "$#u\' curve computation.
5. The above developments assume that the individual
power plant variables may be obtained by synchronized
phasor measurement devices placed at each power plant
together with some local processing power to determine
generator angles, speeds and accelerations.
2.3 Devising emergency control actions
For negative margins, the question of concern is : which
corrective actions should be taken to satisfactorily stabi-
lize the system ?
To answer this question, first notice that a negative margin
means that the integral term in eq. (3) (area denoted OQP 0JR 2
in Fig. 2) is not large enough : according to eq. (4) and
Fig. 2, a straightforward suggestion for stabilizing the sys-
tem is to increase this area by increasing the decelerating
power so as to get
O[P










Actually, for obvious security reasons it is advisable to













Further, observe that, as sketched in Fig. 2, there is always
an additional time delay %1P before the corrective action
is triggered; it corresponds to the sum of three terms, viz.
the time needed to receive the real-time measurements3,
the time to transmit the order to the power plant and
the time to apply the corrective action. Observe that the
longer the time delay, the larger the size of the corrective
action (e.g., amount of mechanical power to be shed).
Figure 2 suggests that the size of the corrective action
needed increases more than linearly with the delay time :
the decreasing slope of the
-
:" # 4 curve explains this
non-linearity.
Existence of this delay makes also more difficult the han-
dling of real-time measurements when designing control
actions. Indeed, just after the corrective action has been
taken, the incoming measurements refer to the uncon-
trolled system, while what actually matters is the be-
haviour of the controlled system. This issue is addressed
below.
2.4 Generation shedding assessment
The general procedure of ` 2.3 is applied here to the par-
ticular case of generation shedding. The generators to
be shed are chosen among those belonging to the criti-
cal cluster, as identified in ` 2.2. Hence, the concern is
to appraise the amount of generation to be shed so as to
stabilize the system by increasing the decelerating area
according to the general eq. (6) and Fig. 2. Subsequently,
i.e. after the corresponding control order has been sent
to the generator plant, it is important to continue refin-
ing the assessment of area O[P 01R 3 using new real-time
measurements. The purpose is to assess whether the gen-
eration shedding already determined is indeed sufficient
or, otherwise, how much additional generation should be
shed. Obviously, because of the transmission delays, one
should anticipate the changes introduced by the control,
based on information gathered prior to this control. As
will be seen, this prediction is possible with good accuracy
and straightforward computations.
To determine how many generators to shed, we will set
up an approximation of the margin in terms of the number
of generators shed and solve for the latter so as to yield
a positive margin. Figures 3 schematically illustrate the
"M#Qv' curves of the original ( wyx ) and controlled ( G ) sys-
tem; they correspond to the real-world example presented
in Section 4.








OMIB inertia in the original system (to distinguish it from
the system after generation shedding) and Z
zJ|
its margin
computed at time % according to eqs. (3) and (4), which























denotes the kinetic energy
that the system will have at time % , when the generation
3since measurements concerning the system at time   are received with
some delay
3
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Figure 3 - Generation shedding emergency control
shedding operation is supposed to take place. It may be
























where " # is computed via the prediction formula (1).
Angle ' at this time instant is also predicted from the last
















the equivalent OMIB inertia of the controlled system after
shedding of some machines, a similar equation holds for
its margin Z R , supposing that generation shedding will
take place at time % :
Z c K 
1
2

































where  1 denotes the proportion of relevant machines
remaining in operation.
Thus, the generation shedding technique amounts to deter-
mining the value of  which cancels out Z R . Now, note
that in order to predict the value of Z R for a given number






























Eqs (12) merely assume that the mechanical powers of
the individual machines are not affected by the gen-
eration shedding, during the short time frame consid-
ered. Eqs (13) assume that the remaining machines will
take over the electrical power initially generated, which
amounts to neglecting the increase in the equivalent tran-
sient and transformer reactances, thus leading to opti-
mistic errors; if the number of generators shed is small
with respect to the total number in operation and if the
transmission lines are long, this approximation error will
however be negligible.
Thus the procedure to determine the number of genera-
tors to shed consists of computing Z R (eq. (10) to (13))
for decreasing numbers of generators in the controlled
system.
Another possibility is provided by the direct computation
described below.
2.5 Direct computation of the number of
machines to shed
The following assumptions allow deriving a formula of the
controlled system margin Z R as an analytical expression
of  :
9 R K 9
zJ|
; ' R K'
z|
(14)
'*)  K 'a)

N (15)




























































Of course in practice only an integer number of generators
may be shed.
Notice that assumptions (14) imply that the critical gen-
erators are coherent which is generally valid. Assump-
tion (15), on the other hand, is more questionable, since
eqs (12-13) imply that '*) I '*)

(see Fig. 3). Thus eq.
(16) essentially underestimates the benefit of shedding.
Similarly, eqs (14) lead to underestimating the benefit of
control actions.
Comment
While the stability prediction step of the original system
requires only information about machine inertias, angles,
speeds and accelerations, the generation shedding ap-
plication requires additional information concerning the
electrical and mechanical powers of the machines.
3 PRACTICAL PROCEDURE AND RE-
LATED CONCERNS
This section gives a detailed description of the practical
procedure resulting from the previous developments. Its
purpose is to clarify and make easier the understanding
of the method’s application to the real-world example
described in next section.
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3.1 Notation related to various times
% 0 : fault clearing time, i.e. time when the sys-
tem enters its post-fault configuration. In
case the contingency comprises successive
actions, % 0 denotes the end of the last
action.
%,+ : time instant where the system stability is
predicted; for example, where it is found to
be unstable, i.e. where conditions (2) are
reached (cfr to `a` 2.2 and 3.3 below)
%1P : time delay between %,+ and the moment the
corrective action is triggered :
%1P = %1P 1 2{%1P 2 2U%1P 3 where
% P 1 : time needed to receive the real-time
measurements 4
% P 2 : time needed to transmit the order to the
substation 5
% P 3 : time needed to apply the corrective action
(e.g., 50 ms)
% = % + 2U% P
∆ % : observation rate, i.e. rate at which the mea-









Parameters '7C97o;^7"M# 7¡" 0 7o"<U7
_
denote respec-
tively OMIB rotor angle, speed, acceleration, accelerating
power, electrical power, mechanical power and inertia co-
efficient.
Suffix ¢ (resp. £ ) refers to the mode of machines’
separation into the critical (resp. backward) cluster and
the corresponding relevant (resp. backward) machines.
Suffix ¤ denotes parameter values
-
'a+o7C9$+o7 etc) at %=K¥%,+ .
Suffix ¦ stands for “unstable” : unstable angle, ' ) , time
to instability, %,) , reached when conditions (2) are met.
Suffices wyx and G refer to parameter values at %=K§%,+82%1P
where the corrective action is triggered :
wyx stands for “original” and refers to parameter values
before control




¦HG84 refers to the unstable value of angle or
speed of the original (controlled) OMIB.
3.3 General procedure
The main steps of the emergency SIME can be summa-
rized as follows.
1. OMIB identification :
Prediction of the individual machines at some time
(e.g. 100 ms) ahead, using Taylor series and multima-
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2«ª denotes a time slightly
4since measurements concerning the system at time   are received
with some delay (e.g., 50 ms).
5This delay vanishes when the measurements are collected at (or very
close to) the substitution of concern.
larger than the clearing time). Continue as in (i) of
` 2.2 to identify the mode of machines’ separation and
hence the corresponding OMIB structure.
2. Prediction of the " # vs ' curve :
proceed according to (ii) of ` 2.2.
3. Computation of ' ) :
proceed according to (iii) of ` 2.2.
4. Computation of Z :
proceed according to (iv) of ` 2.2.
5. Assessment of the number of generators to shed :
apply eq. (17) to compute  ; consider only integer
numbers of generators. In this expression :
' , i.e. '
-
%,+¬2(%1P­4 is obtained by a first order Taylor
















2 is computed according to eq. (9), given
the prediction formula (1)
" 0
®z|
is computed via a prediction formula similar to
(1)
6. Checking the accuracy of Z :
repeat above steps (1) to (4) for successive %,+ ’s to
check whether the successive Z values converge to a
constant, as they should (see Comment # 4 of ` 2.2),
or to continue further.
7. Checking the effectiveness of the corrective action :
similarly, repeat step 5 with refreshed parameter val-
ues to assess whether the corrective action (generation
shedding) has indeed stabilized enough the power sys-
tem or whether to shed more generators.
4 REAL-WORLD EXAMPLE
4.1 Power system description
The generation shedding scheme proposed in the previous
section is illustrated on the South-Southeast Brazilian sys-
tem. This system comprises 63 machines, 1,180 busses
and 1,962 lines; it is modelled in its usual detailed way.
The generation shedding scheme is applied to the Itaipu
transmission system (there are 8 machines of 700 MW,
at the 60 Hz side of Itaipu), whose prefault topology is
portrayed in Fig. 4.
This system is equipped with automatic control devices.
Their objective is to avoid overloads larger than 50 % on
line(s)/transformer(s) resulting from the loss (opening) of
other line(s)/transformer(s) following an important distur-
bance. The order for corrective action is sent by carrier,
and consists of disconnecting “ ¯ ” machines at the 60 Hz
power plant of Itaipu. ( ¯ should not exceed 5 so as to
ensure a minimum of 3 machines in service). The order is
triggered 150 ms after the fault initiation, i.e. 70 ms after
the fault clearance (20 ms for the order to reach Itaipu and
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Figure 4 - Topology of the Itaipu’s transmission system (60 Hz)
4.2 Simulations description
For want of real-world measurements, the emergency
SIME is illustrated on the basis of time-domain simula-
tions using the ST-600 program of Hydro-Que´bec [Valette
et al., 1987]. Real-time measurements are thus “artifi-
cially” created. To ease the description, the acquisition of
these measurements is supposed to have an observation
rate of 20 ms, which is larger than one sample per cycle
mentioned earlier in the paper.
The considered contingency consists of a three-phase
short-circuit (3ΦSC), applied either at bus # 16 or at bus
# 89.
4.3 Simulation results
Two cases are simulated and reported below. The first
refers to the application of the “pure” emergency SIME
scheme applied to a 3ΦSC at bus # 16; the second to a
“hybrid” emergency scheme applied to a 3ΦSC at bus
# 89.
4.3.1 3ΦSC at bus # 16
This 3ΦSC is supposed to be cleared at % 0 K 80 ms by
opening of one line connecting buses 16-89.
The first set of measurements is supposed to be acquired
at 95 ms, followed by sets acquired every 20 ms : 115,
135, 155.
1.- A second order Taylor series expansion of the multi-
machine swing curves about 155 ms gives a first a criti-
cal cluster of 62 machines; but the following expansions
about 175 7 195 , etc. identify the critical cluster to be
composed of the 8 machines at Itaipu.
2.- Using the measurement sets acquired every 20 ms and
the resulting OMIB at %,+°K 155 7 175 7*NNﬃN , the "M#
-
'4
curve is predicted and therefrom the parameters '*)u7o%,)u7sZ
according to the procedure of ` 2.2, summarized in ` 3.3.
Table 1 gathers the results obtained from %,+®K 155 ms up
to 435 ms. It conveys the following information.
(i) At %,+<K 235 ms , the Z value shows to have been sta-
bilized and therefore the " #
-
'4 prediction to be reliable.
Hence, it is decided to shed generation at Itapu in order to
cancel the negative margin. This generation is found to
amount to “1.4” machines. Hence, it is decided to shed 2
machines. The control decided at 235 ms is supposed to
be triggered at 150 ms later, i.e. at 385 ms ( %1PuK 150 ms ,
with % P 1 K% P 2 K§% P 3 K 50 ms) .
(ii) Hence, from % + K 255 ms on, column 6 provides the
predicted value of the margin obtained after shedding 2
out of the 8 machines at Itaipu, i.e., describes the actual
method’s monitoring. On the other hand, information of
columns 2 to 5 is still reported, essentially for illustration.
(iii) To summarize, the emergency SIME was able to
stabilize the (otherwise unstable) stability case by shed-
ding 2 out of the 8 machines of Itapu. The control ac-
tion was taken at 385 ms after the contingency inception,
i.e. 305 ms after its clearance. Note that this time is
smaller than the time to instability, which amounts to
about 580 ms. Note also that the whole procedure would
have been slightly faster if the measurements sampling
was of 1 cycle ( ? 17 ms).
Finally we mention that the CCT of this contingency is
found to be of 72 ms (i.e. slightly smaller than the as-
Table 1 - Transient stability assessment and control
by SIME














155 / / µ 0 62 /
175 2.08 743 ¶ 0 · 54 8 /
195 2.07 727 ¶ 0 · 58 8 /
215 1.96 596 ¶ 1 · 21 8 /
235 1.96 591 ¶ 1 · 23 8 /
255 1.95 585 ¶ 1 · 28 8 1.82
275 1.93 576 ¶ 1 · 34 8 1.79
295 1.93 575 ¶ 1 · 34 8 1.73
315 1.93 571 ¶ 1 · 35 8 1.74
335 1.93 572 ¶ 1 · 41 8 1.78
355 1.93 572 ¶ 1 · 41 8 1.72
375 1.94 579 ¶ 1 · 35 8 1.78
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Figure 5 - Chronology of successive control actions
sumed clearing time of 80 ms.)
4.3.2 3ΦSC at bus # 89
This contingency is supposed to be cleared at %10FK 80 ms
by opening line 89-105. Note that the minimum clearing
time that actually could be realized is about 42 ms (2.5
cycles).
The generation shedding device actually implemented at
Itaipu to face this contingency consists of shedding 5
machines; the action is taken 70 ms after the line open-
ing (20 ms are needed for data transmission and 50 ms
to trigger the action). This important amount of genera-
tion shedding is justified by the extreme severity of this
contingency.
Obviously, the “pure” emergency SIME scheme could not
stabilize such a violent instability, since its action could
not be triggered fast enough. Therefore the purpose here
was to find the minimum number of machines to shed at
%=K 80 2 70 K 150 ms . The following simulation results
are obtained with three different (intervals of) clearing





– ¯{K 3 shed at 80 2 70 K 150 ms : the emergency
SIME shows that 3 more machines should be shed
subsequendtly, which is not an acceptable solution
– ¯]K 4 shed at 150 ms : the emergency SIME shows
that shedding 1 more generator later on may sta-
bilize the system, provided that %1P decreases to
125 ms, which would imply a decentralized con-
trol scheme (i.e. a local control at Itaipu). Fig-
ure 5 describes the sequence of events. Note that
_
denotes the OMIB inertia coefficient; its value
changes every time the number of the machines of







ms : shedding 4 machines after 150 ms







ms : stabilization becomes possible by
shedding 4 generators at 150 ms after the disturbance.
In summary, this series of simulations shows that if the
contingency can be cleared as early as 54 ms after its
inception, the system stabilization may be realized by
shedding 4 (instead of 5) generators. The “economy” of
1 generator with respect to the actual automatic shedding
procedure is made possible thanks to the emergency SIME
and its guarantee to monitor the system in a closed loop
fashion.
5 On types of emergency control schemes
Various emergency schemes may be thought of, depend-
ing in particular upon the very type of corrective action,
the type of instability detection, and the type of deci-
sion making/taking. Observe, however, that emergency
control is generally a last resort action aiming to protect
particularly important parts of a power system (e.g., large
hydro-electric generation stations, corridors transferring
important amounts of power, etc.). Hence, it is likely that
the very type of corrective actions is predetermined and
pre-installed. Thus, generally, what has to be assessed is
whether and how much of this action to take.
With this observation in mind,one may distinguish the fol-
lowing three broad types of emergency control schemes.
First, the “pure” emergency scheme, where the instability
detection, the decision for control and the corrective action
triggering are all decided in the during-transients period,
after a disturbance has actually occurred and (hopefully)
cleared. This scheme relies on real-time measurements
only.
Second, the “hybrid” emergency scheme where the detec-
tion is done in the during-transients period on the basis of
real-time measurements, but the size of the corrective ac-
tion is pre-decided on the basis of simulations performed
in the preventive mode [Kundur, 1997].
Finally, the “off-line emergency scheme” which is de-
signed and taken prior to the actual disturbance inception,
on the basis of preventive transient stability assessment
and control.
The “pure” during-transients scheme is probably the most
economic; but it is also the most difficult to design and
less fast to execute. The pure off-line emergency scheme
has opposite features.
The emergency SIME described in this paper succeeds
in designing a “pure”, during-transients transient stability
assessment and control scheme : it relies on real-time
measurements only; it is contingency independent, in that
the contingency influence (occurrence and nature) is im-
plicitly included in the real-time measurements; it pro-
vides a closed-loop control. These are assets of paramount
importance. As a counterpart, to be effective, the method
implies stringent hardware requirements; however, it is
anticipated that such hardware concerns can be tackled
by existing facilities, or at least by facilities feasible with
today’s technology; as it often happens, they may be-
come available provided that the method showns to be
convincingly interesting, i.e. able to encounter important
practical needs.
Admittedly, the method is still in its infance and many
aspects should be further investigated and alternatives as-
sessed, in particular the local vs global alternative. The
latter scheme relies on the complete set of measurements,
collected from all power stations, as is considered in this
paper. This scheme is likely to be more accurate than local
7
schemes¹ but also more demanding in hardware facilities
and slower to apply (because of the increased delays in
collecting measurements); hence it is more expensive,
since being activated later it requires more drastic correc-
tive actions. It could even be uneffective in very severe
instability cases (see, for example ` 4.3.2). On the other
hand, local schemes might be more attractive from a prag-
matic engineering point of view; but they have still to be
devised. In particular, the “area of concern” for a given
type of local emergency control should be properly pre-
defined, and substitutes for the information concerning
the “outside area” should be designed. These and many
other issues are certainly worth to explore. It is antici-
pated that SIME, thanks to its one-machine representation
is likely to overcome the difficulties encountered during
this exploration.
6 CONCLUSION
The emergency SIME scheme was investigated and its
performances were checked in the particular case of the
Itaipu-Foz-do-Iguac¸u corridor.
This emergency SIME scheme was shown to have spe-
cific, intrinsic features; in particular, it relies on real-time
measurements only which free it from system modelling
and parameters uncertainties, and from the necessity to
identify the type, location and clearing scenario of the
contingency; it is extraordinarily fast which is a neces-
sary condition for stabilizing the system in fractions of a
second; it has robust predictive capabilities, both for pre-
dicting early enough the system loss of synchronism and
for monitoring the controlled system relying on measure-
ments acquired before the actual triggering of this control.
It is therefore robust enough to self-controlling possible
inaccuracies, in a closed-loop fashion.
The application of the emergency SIME to the Itaipu site
was shown to provide effective control when used alone
as well as in combination with a pre-designed control
scheme.
This first application was concerned with generation shed-
ding schemes. The obtained results are quite promising
and encourage further research effort to refine develop-
ments and extend the method to other types of control.
APPENDIX : SIME’s FUNDAMENTALS
AND FORMULATION6
A.1 Principle
SIME relies on the conjecture that however complex, the
loss of synchronism of a power system originates from the
irrevocable separation of its machines into two groups.
Accordingly, it replaces these groups by successively a
two-machine then a one-machine infinite bus (OMIB)
system properly identified. The trajectory of this latter
is computed from the multimachine trajectories. Its sta-
bility is assessed using the equal-area criterion and the
6The method is extensively described in [Zhang et al., 1997a, 1998].
derived stability margin, defined as the excess of the de-
celerating over the accelerating area (see below, ` A.4).
A.2 Critical machines and resulting OMIB
On an unstable multimachinetrajectory, the identification
of the machines’ mode of separation uses the following
pattern : (i) at each time step, consider the post-fault
time evolution of the system machines; (ii) sort these ma-
chines in decreasing order of their rotor angles, identify
the largest angular deviation (largest “gap”) between any
two adjacent machines thus sorted, and consider the can-
didate critical machines to be those which are “above this
largest gap”; (iii) compute the corresponding candidate
critical OMIB’s parameters as explained in ` A.3; (iv) stop
the procedure as soon as the candidate OMIB reaches its
unstable angle '*) (defined in ` A.4 and Fig. A.1) and de-
clare it to be the actual “critical OMIB”. Figure A.1 (a)
describes this procedure.
A.3 OMIB parameters
Let ¢ denote the group of critical machines and £
that of the remaining (or backward) machines. The cor-
responding OMIB parameters are readily computed as
follows.
(i) Transform the two clusters into two equivalent ma-
chines, using their corresponding partial center of angle.
























A N 1 4
where
_
¿ denotes the inertia coefficient of machine Á .
Similar expressions hold for cluster £ and angle '

.
(ii) Reduce this two-machine system into an equivalent













A N 2 4
and whose rotor speed, 9 , and acceleration, ; , are
defined in a similar way.



































4 is the equivalent


















OMIB electrical power " 0 takes on a similar expression.










’s) powers are considered to be free
from any simplifying assumption (they are provided at







A.4 Calculation of stability margins
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expresses the OMIB power-angle dynamics. Fig-
ure A.1 (b) portrays a typical OMIB power-angle vari-




















































(c) OMIB EAC in terms of


















 ( W  ) : clearing angle (time)
T











	 : decelerating power
Figure A.1 -
The well-known equal-area criterion provides a synthetic
transient stability assessment via the stability margin :
ZÕKBO P 0JRÓ\O # R,R
-
A N 5 4
and states that : for a given stability scenario , i.e. clearing
time % 0 and corresponding clearing angle ' 0 , the OMIB
system is unstable (resp. stable) if Z 0 (resp. Z I
0 ). The borderline case, ZÖK 0 , provides the limit
(in)stability condition, in terms of critical clearing time
or maximum power. For example, Fig. 1b corresponds to
an unstable case.
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Equations (A.4)-(A.6) readily yield the following (Zhang
et al., 1997a) :
× general expression, for 'K¥'
-
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A N 8 4
The emergency SIME makes use of these expressions.
Finally, notice that in the emergency SIME context, the
area of concern is comprised between '*+
-
%,+14 and ' ) ( %,+
being the time at which SIME starts predicting the system
transient behaviour (see Section 2 and Fig. 1). It is thus
interesting to modify expression (A.6) as follows (see the























































the system will be anticipated to go unstable.
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